In its 2016 decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed its previous ruling in Miller v. Alabama, that imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender pursuant to a mandatory penalty scheme violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court also held in Montgomery that, because life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders should be exceedingly rare, sentencing judges violate Miller’s rule any time they impose a discretionary life-without parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender without first concluding that the offender is permanently incapable of reform. Following Miller and Montgomery, however, the question remained whether and how to enforce the requirement that sentencing judges limit life-without-parole sentences to those who are permanently incapable of reform. The Court considered this question in Jones v. Mississippi.
Brett Jones, the petitioner, received a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for killing his grandfather. He was 15 at the time of the offense. Several years later, Mr. Jones had a resentencing hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility under Mississippi law. In light of Miller and Montgomery, which were decided after Mr. Jones was originally sentenced, the sentencing court weighed various factors and concluded that Mr. Jones was not eligible for parole. The court did not, however, expressly find that Mr. Jones was permanently incapable of reform. Mr. Jones challenged the determination that he was not eligible for parole as inadequate under Miller and Montgomery and argued that the sentencer was required to find that he was permanently incapable of reform before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. LDF filed an amicus brief with the Juvenile Law Center, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and 65 other organizations highlighting the disproportionate number of Black youths who are serving life-without-parole sentences and emphasizing that a finding of permanent incorrigibility would help to ensure that courts do not base life-without-parole sentences on impermissible factors such as race.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that Miller and Montgomery do not require a sentencer to make an express finding that a juvenile is permanently incapable of reform before sentencing them to life without the possibility of parole. According to the Court, all the U.S. Constitution requires is that a sentencer retain discretion in imposing a sentence and that life-without-parole sentences are not mandatory for any juvenile offender. The Court’s decision substantially curtailed the reach of the its prior decisions in Miller and Montgomery and undermines the principle that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles should be reserved only for those who are determined to be permanently incapable of reform.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—a fundamental protection against law enforcement misconduct— expressly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Court decisions often focus on the “reasonableness” of an officer’s conduct in determining whether a search or seizure meets the constitutional standard. In Torres v. Madrid, the Supreme Court considered whether a Fourth Amendment “seizure” had occurred at all.
Early in the morning on July 15, 2014, Roxanne Torres was sitting in the driver’s seat of her parked car when two state police officers approached her vehicle. The officers wore dark clothing, and Ms. Torres did not recognize them as police officers. The officers shouted commands at Ms. Torres and, when she did not respond, pulled their guns. Ms. Torres believed the officers were carjackers and began driving the car forward. The officers opened fire on Ms. Torres in an attempt to stop her from leaving. The officers fired 13 shots at Ms. Torres; two of the bullets entered her back and temporarily paralyzed her. Despite being hit, Ms. Torres was able to drive away to a nearby hospital. The following day, Ms. Torres was arrested at the hospital on charges related to the incident. Ms. Torres sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a federal civil rights statute that allows a person to sue for damages when a state official violates their constitutional rights), alleging the officers violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizures when they shot her twice in the back. The officers argued that the protections of the Fourth Amendment did not apply because they never seized Ms. Torres as they did not acquire physical control of her at the time they shot her. The district court agreed with the officers, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Ms. Torres was not “seized” under the Fourth Amendment because, “[d]espite being shot, Torres did not stop or otherwise submit to the officers’ authority.” Ms. Torres asked the Supreme Court to review the decision.
LDF filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in support of Ms. Torres, arguing that the Tenth Circuit’s position would leave many innocent victims of police misconduct without a legal remedy under Section 1983. LDF also argued that such a holding would be particularly troubling for African Americans because they have disproportionately been victims of police violence that often involves firearms and other weapons. The Supreme Court held, in a 5-3 decision, that an officer’s use of physical force, coupled with an intent to restrain a person, constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. The Court disagreed with the proposition that a seizure requires actual, intentional acquisition of a person and concluded that the officers in this case seized Ms. Torres when they shot her in the back. The Court’s decision is an important recognition of the broad scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections as a bulwark against law enforcement misconduct.
Last year, the Supreme Court held in Ramos v. Louisiana that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires unanimous juries for criminal convictions in state courts. The Court’s decision in Ramos stemmed from challenges to provisions in Oregon and Louisiana that permitted criminal convictions by non-unanimous juries. The Court recognized that those states’ nonunanimous jury provisions had racist roots and, partially on that basis, held that they were unconstitutional. Under a longstanding rule that cases announcing important new constitutional rules only apply prospectively, however, the Court’s decision in Ramos only applied to cases then-pending on direct review before a state or federal court at the time the decision was issued. It did not apply to cases where the defendant had already exhausted their direct appeals at the time of the decision. The question in Edwards v. Vannoy was whether the Ramos rule should apply retroactively to people whose direct appeals were completed, but who had not yet exhausted federal collateral review of their convictions.
Thedrick Edwards was charged with armed robbery and kidnapping in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During jury selection at Mr. Edward’s trial, the State removed all but one Black juror. Mr. Edwards was convicted of the crimes charged and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The jury convicted him by an 11-1 vote on one armed robbery count and two kidnapping counts, and by a 10-2 vote on the remaining armed robbery counts. The lone Black juror voted to acquit Mr. Edwards of all counts. A Louisiana Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Edwards’ convictions, and a federal district and appellate court denied his requests for habeas relief. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Ramos.
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Edwards argued that the Ramos decision should apply retroactively to cases pending on federal collateral review. Under the Supreme Court ruling in Teague v. Lane, “new” rules have retroactive effect only if they fall into one of two categories: “watershed” new procedural rules that implicate fundamental fairness and accuracy in criminal trials, and “substantive” new rules that place persons beyond the state’s power to punish. Before Edwards, the Supreme Court had not readily applied new procedural rules retroactively, and it indicated in Ramos that it was not inclined to do so for the unanimity rule.
LDF filed an amicus brief urging the Court to retroactively apply the unanimity rule to cases pending on federal collateral review. LDF explained the racist origins of Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule—which was originally adopted in 1898 for the express purpose of obtaining criminal convictions against Black defendants. Finally, we emphasized that Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury rule functioned as intended, as not-guilty votes by Black jurors were regularly overridden by the supermajority vote of non-minority jurors. This, LDF argued, undermined the accuracy of convictions obtained from non-unanimous juries, and persons convicted under the discriminatory non-unanimous jury regime should have an opportunity to have their convictions unanimously decided.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the Ramos decision does not apply retroactively. In so holding, the Court emphasized the importance of the Ramos decision, but pointed to the dearth of prior opinions retroactively applying “watershed” rules of criminal procedure to conclude that Ramos did not deserve retroactive treatment and that no future case concerning “watershed” rules of criminal procedure would either. Thus, the Ramos decision will not apply retroactively to the hundreds of people who were convicted by non-unanimous juries in Louisiana and Oregon and who exhausted all direct appeals prior to the Ramos decision.
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution established that the right to vote cannot be denied or abridged on the basis of race. The Amendment was largely circumvented for nearly a century following its ratification, as Southern states adopted voting laws—such as laws requiring people to demonstrate literacy, to prove their good character, or to pay poll taxes—with the purpose of disenfranchising Black people. To remedy this discrimination, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which provided a variety of means for the federal government and federal courts to ensure that the right to vote is not denied or abridged on the basis of race. The VRA contained two key provisions. The first was Section 2, which prohibits voting practices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race. The second was Section 5, which required states with a history of discrimination to obtain “preclearance” from the federal government before passing new voting laws; this procedure permitted the federal government to determine whether proposed voting laws would discriminate against historically disenfranchised voters and to block those that would.
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Court rendered inoperative the “preclearance” provision, thus leaving Section 2 as the primary provision for securing voting rights. Following the Court’s decision in Shelby County, states across the country passed laws that were previously blocked by the federal government because of their potential negative impact on minority voters, and civil rights plaintiffs have challenged many of these laws as violative of Section 2. For decades, the Supreme Court has avoided considering Section 2 cases challenging state laws that deny or abridge the right to vote. Deciding to review the lower court decision in Brnovich created an opportunity for the Court to opine on the standard governing Section 2 “vote denial” cases.
In 2016, the Democratic National Committee and other plaintiffs sued Arizona’s Secretary of State and Attorney General to challenge two Arizona voting provisions as violative of the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. The first was a policy that completely rejected in-person ballots cast in the wrong voting precinct, even for state-wide or national elections not tied to or dependent on local precincts. The second was a law that criminalizes third-party ballot collection in most circumstances. This law disproportionately affected Arizona’s Native American communities, which largely occupy rural lands and lack access to regular mail delivery services. The district court found in favor of Arizona, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court agreed to review the decision. LDF submitted an amicus brief explaining that Section 2’s text, history, and purpose prohibit voting measures that interact with social or historical discrimination to burden Black voters’ access to the franchise, even if the state is not directly responsible for the social or historical conditions.
In a 6-3 decision, and over the strong dissent of Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, the Court held that neither of the challenged Arizona provisions violates Section 2, and the ballot-return law was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose. In so holding, the Court outlined new, burdensome factors for lower courts to consider when analyzing challenges to voting laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court’s decision will make future challenges to discriminatory voting laws more difficult and will allow states to continue to enact discriminatory and burdensome voting requirements.
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced—but did not eliminate—a 100:1 sentencing disparity for crack-cocaine offenses when compared to powder cocaine offenses. For years, this 100:1 disparity led to disproportionately excessive sentences for Black Americans, who were more likely to be convicted of crack-cocaine offenses, compared to White Americans who were more likely to be convicted of powder cocaine offenses. The First Step Act, passed by Congress in 2018, retroactively applied reduced sentencing provisions to people sentenced under the previous 100:1 disparity.
The question before the Court in Terry v. United States was whether the First Step Act retroactively applies to people sentenced to crimes involving the lowest amounts of crackcocaine. LDF, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the R Street Institute, filed an amicus brief highlighting that Congressional sponsors and supporters of the First Step Act intended to address the egregious and racially inequitable crack-powder sentencing disparities for all offenders, which continue to adversely impact the lives of thousands of Black Americans and their families.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the First Step Act does not permit people convicted and sentenced for offenses involving small amounts of crack-cocaine to be resentenced where their conviction did not result in a mandatory minimum sentence. The Court’s decision thus leaves people convicted for selling the smallest amounts of crack-cocaine with no avenue for petitioning for resentencing under the First Step Act. Thus, people who did not receive mandatory minimum sentences, but whose sentences were nonetheless impacted by the heightened sentences for crack-cocaine offenses, cannot seek relief under the First Step Act.
Congress originally passed Section 1983 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Enforcement Act of 1871) in response to racial violence and terror against Black people by the Ku Klux Klan and others, often law enforcement officials or other powerful state actors who went unpunished in state courts. Today, Section 1983 is the main statute that permits civil lawsuits against officers who violate federal constitutional rights. However, many lawsuits against state officials are foreclosed by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which is a judge-made defense that immunizes officers from suit—even if they violate a person’s constitutional rights—if their actions did not violate “clearly established” law. Many courts have interpreted the “clearly established” law requirement to mean that an officer is immune from civil liability where there is not a prior case with nearly identical facts that squarely proscribed the officer’s actions. This has made it difficult for civil litigants to obtain remedies for constitutional violations and has left law enforcement officers largely unaccountable for their actions.
In 2020, the Supreme Court issued an important decision — Taylor v. Riojas — clarifying the extent of the qualified immunity doctrine. Trent Taylor, an incarcerated person in Texas, was forced to spend six days in cells that contained feces from previous occupants and that were overflowing with sewage. Mr. Taylor sued the correctional officers, alleging that their conduct violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officers were protected by qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that “prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste” “for six days.” In a short, unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, concluding that any reasonable officer could have concluded that housing Mr. Taylor in unsanitary conditions for an extended period of time was unlawful. In so doing, the Supreme Court explained that a general constitutional rule may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, such that a plaintiff need not identify a case with nearly identical facts to overcome an officer’s qualified immunity defense.
This was a positive development in the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, as it signals to lower courts that rigid application of the qualified immunity doctrine to immunize clearly unconstitutional behavior is not required.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, many low-wage workers struggled to afford housing, food, utilities, and medical care. The COVID-19 pandemic, the largest public health emergency in more than a century, has exacerbated the economic hardships many people were already facing, with a disproportionate impact on Black people. To assist, the federal government—first Congress, and then, by direction of the President and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—imposed a series of eviction moratoria to ban landlords from evicting tenants who cannot pay their rent.
In May 2021, a group of Alabama real estate agents sued the federal government and challenged the most recent moratorium issued by the CDC. The real estate agents argue that the CDC does not have the power to impose a nationwide moratorium on evictions. A federal district court agreed with the real estate agents but allowed the moratorium to stay in place while the federal government appealed. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also permitted the moratorium to stay in place.
The realtors sought relief from the Supreme Court, but the Court denied their application. In a short order, the Court concluded that because the CDC’s eviction moratorium concludes on July 31, 2021, the realtors should wait until the moratorium expires. This will provide an opportunity for Congress to consider provisions for appropriate rental assistance funds and to potentially authorize a continuation of the CDC’s eviction moratorium. Thus, thousands of renters have more time before rental evictions are allowed to proceed.
