Welcome to the annual roundup of U.S. Supreme Court civil rights cases from the Thurgood Marshall Institute of the Legal Defense Fund (LDF). The SCOTUS 2024 Term Roundup provides a snapshot of each case’s issues, outcome, and impact on civil rights. This easy-to-digest summary underscores the importance of the U.S. Supreme Court, and other courts, to our lives and the future of the nation’s democracy.
Since its inception, LDF has served on the front lines of civil rights litigation efforts, including arguing many groundbreaking cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. During the 2024 Supreme Court term, LDF either litigated or filed/joined an amicus brief in five cases that affect civil rights: Louisiana v. Callais, United States v. Skrmetti, Lackey v. Stinnie, Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, and Barnes v. Felix. The SCOTUS 2024 Term Roundup reviews the aforementioned cases as well as five additional cases with important civil rights implications: Glossip v. Oklahoma, Bondi v. VanDerStok, Mahmoud v. Taylor, Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, and Trump v. CASA, Inc.
This case concerns the constitutionality of Louisiana’s congressional map, adopted through Senate Bill 8. In January 2024, Louisiana redrew its congressional map to add a second majority-Black district in response to Robinson v. Ardoin (later Robinson v. Landry), successful voting rights litigation brought by LDF and others on behalf of the NAACP Louisiana State Conference, Power Coalition for Equity and Justice, and nine individual Black voters. LDF successfully argued in Robinson that Louisiana’s 2022 map likely violated Section Two of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by packing Black voters into a single majority-Black district, thereby diluting the voting strength of Black voters in the other districts. Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry and other legislative leaders decided that rather than accepting a court-imposed map, it was in Louisiana’s best interest to draw their own map that satisfied the VRA. S.B. 8 became law in January 2024. However, the legislators deviated from the map that was presented to the court: the new map protected powerful incumbents in Louisiana’s congressional delegation, including U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson, while also uniting communities with shared interests along the Red River and the I-49 corridor.
On January 31, 2024, twelve self-described “non-African American voters” filed a lawsuit, Callais v. Landry, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana challenging this newly enacted congressional map as a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They argued that the map-drawing process was predominated by considerations of race. The Robinson case Plaintiffs intervened in this new lawsuit, Callais v. Landry, as Defendants. Intervention is a legal procedure that permits nonparties to “intervene,” or join, ongoing litigation to ensure that their interests are fairly represented. The Robinson Plaintiffs intervened in Callais to safeguard the hard-won voting opportunities the S.B. 8 map made possible for Black Louisianians. They further sought to protect Supreme Court precedent that confirms it is not an unconstitutional gerrymander for states to fix VRA violations, even when the map considers other factors like incumbency protection.
The District Court’s three-judge panel held a consolidated preliminary injunction hearing and trial in April 2024. On April 30, 2024, it issued a 2-1 decision that Louisiana’s new congressional map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and it struck down the use of the map for future elections. LDF and the State of Louisiana filed applications with the U.S. Supreme Court for emergency stays of the District Court’s strike of the map, pending the case’s appeal. The Supreme Court stayed the lower court’s ruling pending the resolution of the appeal, meaning that S.B. 8 remained the operative map into the 2024 elections and therefore Black Louisianians were able to elect their preferred candidate in two congressional districts. The Supreme Court granted the emergency stay application because it believed that the map was struck down too close to the 2024 elections.
On March 24, 2025, LDF argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that the congressional map that was in place during the 2024 election cycle, S.B. 8, should remain because it satisfied Section Two of the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. LDF advanced the position that the 2024 map fairly recognized the political power of Black Louisianians, who comprise one-third of the state’s population.
LDF Redistricting Manager Stuart Naifeh, who argued the case before the Supreme Court, said in a statement, “The protections of the VRA and Equal Protection Clause were designed to prevent discrimination and ensure that Black voters are not shut out of the political process. This case represented an effort to turn back the clock and undermine hard-fought efforts to achieve a map that finally reflects Louisiana’s communities and provides an equal voice to Black voters. But there can be no question that the current map is lawful, fair, and should remain in place. The Supreme Court should not undermine lawmakers’ agency in remedial map-drawing nor the VRA protections that Black voters have been fighting for in Louisiana for the last four years—and across the nation for generations.”
The Supreme Court did not issue a decision. Instead, the Court issued an order calling for re-argument in Louisiana v. Callais. The request for re-argument signals the significance this case holds for the future of fair representation. Importantly, the current congressional map, with two majority-Black districts, remains in effect pending the Court’s decision. The re-argument presents another opportunity for the Court to uphold what two lower courts and decades of precedent have already recognized: that states must comply with the VRA when drawing congressional maps and that they have flexibility in the manner in which they choose to comply. LDF will continue to fight for Black Louisianians, who deserve the same fair and effective representation as any other community. This case is about more than just maps—it is about the future of a multi-racial democracy and the mutual commitment to ensure that every vote counts and every voice is heard in the political process.
This case concerns whether states can ban medically necessary gender-affirming health care for transgender youth. In 2023, Tennessee enacted Senate Bill 1 to ban the provision of and access to gender-affirming health care, such as hormone replacement therapy and puberty blockers, for transgender people under eighteen years of age. Under this law, health care providers who violate these restrictions are liable to civil lawsuits and risk the suspension of their license to practice medicine. Transgender youth, along with their parents and a doctor who treats transgender patients, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 1 and seeking a preliminary injunction against Tennessee’s enforcement of the law. They claimed that S.B. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it discriminates on the basis of sex and transgender status. The United States intervened in the case under 42 U.S.C. 2000h-2, which authorizes intervention in a private equal-protection suit “if the Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public importance.” The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the law should be subject to heightened scrutiny and likely violates the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court further held that the law is likely unconstitutional even if it is not subject to heightened scrutiny. That same year, Kentucky’s legislature enacted a similar ban, over Governor Andy Beshear’s veto. The Kentucky ban applied when treatments were used “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Ky. Rev. Stat.§ 311.372(2). Transgender youth and their parents also challenged this law as violating the Equal Protection Clause and sought a preliminary injunction, which the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases in a consolidated appeal, L.W. v. Skrmetti. A divided panel reversed the district courts’ rulings, reinstating Tennessee and Kentucky’s health care bans. The Sixth Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims, holding that the laws were not subject to heightened review because they regulated “sex-transition treatments for all minors, regardless of [their] sex.” L.W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460, 480 (6th Cir. 2023). Further, the majority concluded that Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim under rational basis review. The United States and the Plaintiffs in both cases appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari to the United States, whose petition addressed only whether Tennessee’s law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
LDF and the law firm Weil, Gotshal, and Manges submitted an amicus brief in United States v. Skrmetti supporting the United States and the private Plaintiffs (the transgender youth, their parents, and the medical provider). The brief placed the Tennessee bill within the broader context of nationwide attacks against LGBTQ+ people and demonstrated how the ban was inextricably tied to discrimination. The brief argued that Tennessee’s ban on gender-affirming health care was grounded in discrimination and bias against transgender people, citing the fact that Tennessee enacted the ban amid a nationwide climate of growing hostility toward transgender people. Further, the brief contended that Tennessee’s law violates the Equal Protection Clause because it targets transgender people for unequal treatment and reflects animus against them. The brief also demonstrated how courts have consistently held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws rooted in bias and prejudice against disfavored groups, and in allowing these bans to stand, the Sixth Circuit failed to apply this precedent. The brief then argued that the Tennessee law should be subject to heightened scrutiny because it constitutes a straightforward, sex-based classification. Because the law does not advance Tennessee’s supposed interest in protecting adolescent health, the brief argued that the law fails heightened scrutiny. Importantly, LDF’s brief underscored how attacks on LGBTQ+ communities are a racial justice issue and result in significant harm to Black transgender people.
In a 6-3 opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (with Justices Jackson, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissenting) the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision banning medically necessary gender-affirming health care for transgender youth. The Supreme Court held that Tennessee’s law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and requires the more deferential standard of review—rational basis. To apply a rational basis review, rather than a more heightened level of review, the Supreme Court reasoned that Tennessee’s law does not classify on the basis of sex or transgender status. The Supreme Court concluded that the law preventing gender-affirming health care for transgender youth instead classifies on the basis of medical treatment and age, not sex. In other words, the majority wrote that S.B. 1 prohibits health care providers from administering puberty blockers and hormones to minors for certain medical uses (gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence), regardless of a minor’s sex. Justices Thomas, Barrett, and Alito all filed concurring opinions. Most notably, Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote that transgender status does not constitute a suspect class, like race or sex, that warrants heightened review.
Justice Sotomayor wrote in the dissenting opinion: “Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’ might justify it. Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims. In sadness, I dissent.”
LDF remains committed to safeguarding the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and ensuring that it is extended to all, including transgender and nonbinary people.
Lackey v. Stinnie involves the procedural issue of when attorney’s fees can be awarded to the prevailing party in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In 2018, Virginia drivers filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 challenging a state law that automatically suspended a driver’s license if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Named Plaintiff Damian Stinnie, along with a class of similarly situated Virginians, argued that the suspension of their driver’s licenses pursuant to Virginia law without sufficient notice or a hearing was a violation of their due process rights. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily barring enforcement of the law. Thereafter, in 2020, the Virginia General Assembly repealed the controversial license suspension law and permanently reinstated the suspended licenses. At that point, the parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot.
Plaintiffs’ counsel invoked 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), a law that permits courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” in certain civil rights cases, including Section 1983 cases. The Plaintiffs and their counsel argued that they prevailed because they won a preliminary injunction and ultimately drove the law to be repealed. However, the District Court declined to award attorney’s fees to Stinnie and the other Virginia drivers on the basis that parties who obtain a preliminary injunction do not qualify as “prevailing parties.” A three-judge panel initially affirmed the ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but then reversed en banc (meaning all the judges on the Fourth Circuit reheard the case) and ruled in favor of Stinnie and the similarly situated Virginia drivers. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Plaintiffs were “prevailing parties” for purposes of Section 1988(b).
LDF joined the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law’s amicus brief in favor of the Plaintiffs, arguing that a fair reading of Section 1988’s text and legislative history compels a construction that enables plaintiffs to be prevailing parties based on a preliminary injunction. The brief further argued that allowing prevailing party status based on preliminary relief, such as a preliminary injunction, minimizes the chance that parties will moot cases to avoid attorney’s fees, which is essentially engaging in gamesmanship of the court system. The brief explained that this case is significant because the availability of attorney’s fees encourages the continued enforcement of civil rights protections by ensuring that there will be counsel to represent clients in these important cases.
In a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts (with Justices Jackson and Sotomayor dissenting), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case. The majority held that the Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees, despite obtaining a preliminary injunction that had provided concrete relief. The Court reasoned that a preliminary injunction only determines that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits. Underscoring the “transient nature of preliminary injunctions,” the Court emphasized that courts regularly reach different outcomes after issuing injunctions. In other words, winning a preliminary injunction is merely “temporary success at an intermediary” stage of a lawsuit. The Court pointed out that preliminary injunctions are a temporary order intended to preserve the status quo until a trial can occur. The Court asserted that “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ under the statute when a court conclusively resolves a claim by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.” That is, the change in legal relationship must be “enduring,” and “the enduring nature of that change must itself be judicially sanctioned.” As such, under the Court’s rationale, external events that moot a case, such as the Virginia legislature repealing a challenged law, do not then transform a temporary injunction into a final adjudication. The Court further concluded that the decision “serves the interests of judicial economy” by establishing a “straightforward, bright-line rule” that will reduce the risk of “‘a second major litigation’ over attorney’s fees.” However, the Court distinguished preliminary injunctions from consent decrees, which the Court concluded do warrant attorney’s fees. The Court reasoned that, unlike preliminary injunctions, consent decrees conclusively resolve the claim, bear a judicial imprimatur, and may grant enduring relief that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.
This case impacts civil rights plaintiffs and litigation because it undermines the incentives for plaintiffs and counsel to bring future actions to enforce civil rights. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson highlighted this dilemma by pointing out that Virginia repealed the harmful law precisely because of the strength of the Virginia drivers’ challenge. When a defendant can moot a case through voluntary conduct, lawyers may be hesitant to bring a claim against the conduct in the first instance. Notably, many other important statutes enacted by Congress, including the VRA, have similar fee provisions. Attorney’s fees are a crucial way to encourage lawyers to take up civil rights cases and ensure that disadvantaged groups have access to justice and can hold bad actors accountable. Despite this disappointing decision, LDF remains committed to protecting the civil rights of marginalized groups and communities.
This case concerns the legality of Richard Glossip’s death sentence. Glossip and his counsel argued that his case was so infected with prosecutorial misconduct and errors that it would be unconstitutional for Oklahoma to execute him. Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond agreed with Glossip and joined his request to set aside his conviction, writing in support of Glossip’s petition for review that “justice would not be served by moving forward with a capital sentence that the State can no longer defend because of prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error.”
Glossip was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the hotel where Glossip was the manager. The prosecution’s only evidence implicating Glossip in Van Treese’s death was testimony from the hotel’s handyman, Justin Sneed, who told the jury that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court blocked Glossip’s execution so that it could consider a challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
In 2022, for the first time, Glossip was provided access to a set of records that included a memo demonstrating that the prosecution had coached Sneed to change his testimony. Glossip also discovered undisclosed evidence that Sneed had testified falsely that he had not seen a psychiatrist, when in fact a psychiatrist had treated him for bipolar disorder and prescribed him lithium. Drummond appointed an independent counsel to review the case, who reported that he believed a new trial was necessary because “Glossip was deprived of a fair trial in which the State can have confidence in the process and result.”
In response to this new evidence, Glossip filed an application for post-conviction relief, asking the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) to set aside his conviction. Drummond joined Glossip’s request to the OCCA. Before the OCCA, Oklahoma confessed the error and admitted that its failure to disclose the truth about Sneed’s psychiatric condition—leaving the jury with Sneed’s uncorrected false testimony and then suppressing this information for a quarter-century—rendered Glossip’s trial “unfair and unreliable.” The OCCA nonetheless rejected Glossip’s request. Soon after, Oklahoma’s Pardon and Parole Board rejected his request for clemency, which Drummond also supported. Glossip’s execution was scheduled for May 18, 2023.
Glossip, again with Drummond’s support, then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to put his execution on hold while it considered his appeals. The Court agreed to do so. Later, the Court granted certiorari on Glossip’s appeals, meaning that it agreed to decide whether Oklahoma had violated his constitutional rights, under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois, by suppressing the evidence about Sneed’s psychiatric care. The Court also directed the parties to address whether the OCCA’s ruling that Glossip was not entitled to relief under Oklahoma’s post-conviction law rested on an adequate and independent state law ground—which, if it did, would mean that the Court could not review that decision.
Justice Sotomayor authored the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-3 decision tossing out Glossip’s 2004 conviction and death sentence and ordering a new trial (with Justice Gorsuch taking no part in the decision, Justices Thomas and Alito dissenting, and Justice Barrett joining part of the majority but also filing an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court first addressed the procedural question, finding that it had jurisdiction because the Oklahoma state court’s decision did not rest on an independent and adequate state law ground. The majority found that the prosecutors at Glossip’s trial not only withheld important information about a key witness, but also allowed Sneed to lie in court. The majority explained, “Had the prosecution corrected Sneed on the stand, his credibility plainly would have suffered. That correction would have revealed to the jury not just that Sneed was untrustworthy . . . but also that Sneed was willing to lie to them under oath.” It is unconstitutional to knowingly obtain a conviction using false evidence. Napue v. Illinois requires that a conviction knowingly obtained through the use of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared.
The majority explained that Glossip resoundingly established that Sneed’s untruthfulness went uncorrected by the prosecution and was case dispositive, meaning that it was inextricably tied to the outcome of the case. Glossip’s conviction turned on the jury’s assessment of Sneed’s credibility, and the jury would have been less likely to find his testimony credible if prosecutors had properly corrected Sneed’s lies. The majority found a reasonable likelihood that a jury would have acquitted Glossip if it had known Sneed’s testimony was false. Justice Sotomayor wrote in the majority opinion, “The facts as conceded by the attorney general and supported by the record establish a violation of Napue. A new trial is the remedy for a Napue violation. Here, this Court has jurisdiction and a Napue violation occurred. Thus, Glossip is entitled to a new trial.” Because the Court granted relief under Napue, it did not address the merits of Glossip’s Brady claim.
For decades, LDF has been a pioneering voice in the fight to abolish the death penalty, which has its beginnings in slavery, lynchings, and white vigilantism. This case represents an extraordinary win for Glossip, who will receive a new trial and a chance to be fully exonerated. This case also affirms what LDF has long advocated: that people sentenced to death are entitled to the full extent of due process protections. The death penalty is rife with foundational flaws, including official misconduct like that in Glossip’s case and rampant racial discrimination, that render it unworkable and morally bankrupt. LDF will continue to lead in the struggle to end the death penalty.
A police officer’s use of deadly force violates the Fourth Amendment when it is not “objectively reasonable.” Assessing reasonableness requires looking at the “totality of the circumstances.” This case concerns whether courts, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, can apply the “moment-of-threat” rule. Under this rule, a court can only look at the circumstances existing at the precise time when the officer engaged in the use of force.
This case arose from the police killing of an unarmed twenty-four-year-old Black man, Ashtian Barnes, in what began as a routine traffic stop. Barnes was driving to pick up his girlfriend’s daughter from daycare outside of Houston, Texas, in a car that his girlfriend had rented. Unbeknownst to Barnes, the rental car’s license plate was linked to unpaid tolls that had been incurred by a past driver. Roberto Felix Jr., a Harris County police officer, pulled the car over based on the unpaid tolls. During the stop, Barnes could not immediately find his driver’s license or the car’s registration. At that point, Felix demanded that Barnes step out of the car. Barnes began to pull away while the car door remained open. Felix then drew his gun, jumped onto the side of the door while the car was moving, and opened fire on Barnes at point-blank range, killing him. The officer’s dash cam recorded the entire encounter.
Barnes’s mother, Janice Hughes Barnes, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights statute that allows a person to sue a state or federal official who violates their constitutional rights, arguing that the officer’s use of force violated the Fourth Amendment. Applying the “moment-of-threat” framework, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled in favor of the police officer because it found that the “precise moment of the threat” was the “two seconds” when Felix was clinging to the moving car. As such, the District Court limited its inquiry of whether the officer’s use of lethal force was warranted by looking only at the moment Felix was hanging onto the door of a moving car and had to make a split-second decision about how to remove himself from the situation. Under the “moment-of-threat” rule, the question of whether it was reasonable for Felix to hang onto the moving car in the first place was irrelevant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and applied the same “moment-of-threat” rule, holding that its inquiry was confined to whether the officer was “in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in [his] use of deadly force.”
LDF and the National Urban League, represented by O’Melveny & Myers LLP, filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down the “moment-of-threat” rule because it undermines police accountability, encourages police violence, and disproportionately harms Black people. The brief argued that the “moment-of-threat” rule increases the likelihood of violent interactions and decreases trust between police and the public. Under the “moment-of-threat” rule, officers have less incentive to de-escalate encounters. Importantly, the brief highlighted how the “moment-of-threat” rule disproportionately harms Black communities. Looking only to the “moment of threat” when evaluating police use of force risks irreparable damage to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which has long required courts to assess the complete account of a police encounter—including the officer’s misperceived threats arising out of racial stereotypes or discrimination. The brief explained: “Because Black Americans are disproportionately affected by police violence, factfinders assessing use of force cases are more frequently asked to weigh in on whether to use deadly force against Black individuals is reasonable. This makes it imperative, particularly for Black communities, that factfinders make thorough reasonableness determinations, informed by all relevant facts.”
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held, in an opinion written by Justice Kagan, that when a court evaluates a police shooting or some other use of force, applying the “moment-of-threat” rule improperly narrows the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. To adequately assess whether an officer acted reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the relevant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment. The Court held that analyzing the “totality of the circumstances” has no time limit because earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later facts and circumstances. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is supposed to be “fact-dependent and context-sensitive.” The Court further explained that a court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it must put on chronological blinders.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion (joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett) to urge lower courts to “appreciate the extraordinary dangers and risks facing police officers and the community at large.”
This case is a resounding rejection of the “moment-of-threat” rule. The U.S. Supreme Court made clear that a court cannot evaluate a police officer’s use of force devoid of the totality of the circumstances. In a country where Black people are routinely killed by law enforcement and face significant obstacles to obtaining justice, this decision is a step toward advancing police accountability.
This case concerns whether federal agencies can regulate untraceable weapons often referred to as “ghost guns.” In 1968, Congress adopted the Gun Control Act in response to the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The act’s intent was to monitor untraceable guns to stop persons attempting to evade gun control laws. The Gun Control Act of 1968 created requirements for licensing, background checks, record-keeping, and serialization for people engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. It also included regulations on frames or receivers, which are the primary structural components of firearms.
In 2022, the ATF issued a regulation clarifying that “ghost guns,” certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver, fall under the Gun Control Act’s definition of firearms. The ATF adopted the rule in response to an “exponential” increase in ghost guns.
To challenge the ATF’s regulation, manufacturers and sellers of ghost gun kits and parts sued the United States and argued that the ATF’s application of its rule was inconsistent with the Gun Control Act. The U.S. District Court for Northern District of Texas agreed with the manufacturers and sellers, vacating the rule nationwide in June 2023. The United States asked the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene and block the District Court’s injunction. In a 5-4 decision, the Court agreed with the United States and allowed the ATF’s rule to remain in place while the courts considered the merits of the case.
The case then went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court’s decision, writing that the rule is not in line with the Gun Control Act’s text and “exceeds the legislatively imposed limits on agency authority in the name of public policy.” VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2023). The United States again requested that the Supreme Court allow the ATF to enforce the rule while the case continued, and the Court agreed.
In a 7-2 opinion by Justice Gorsuch (with Justices Thomas and Alito each filing a dissenting opinion), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision. The Court held that the ATF’s 2022 rule interpreting the Gun Control Act of 1968 to cover weapons parts kits that can be readily converted into an operational firearm is not inconsistent with the Gun Control Act.
The majority explained its reasoning: “Imagine a rifle disassembled for storage, transport, or cleaning. It may take time to render the rifle useful for combat, but its intended function is clear. And, as a matter of every day speech, that rifle is a weapon, whether disassembled or combat ready. In the same way and for the same reason, an ordinary speaker might well describe the ‘Buy Build Shoot’ kit as a ‘weapon.’ Yes, perhaps a half hour of work is required before anyone can fire a shot. But even as sold, the kit comes with all necessary components, and its intended function as instrument of combat is obvious. Really, the kit’s name says it all: ‘Buy Build Shoot.’”
The Court held that the text of the Gun Control Act imposes two requirements: (1) there must be a weapon; and (2) the weapon must be able to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, be designed to do so, or be susceptible to ready conversion to operate that way. The Court explained further, “Recall the author who refers to her manuscript as a novel, or your friend who calls his IKEA kit a table. In much the same way, an ordinary speaker might well call Polymer80’s product a firearm ‘frame,’ even though a little work is required to complete it.” As such, the Court concluded that the ATF can regulate at least some ghost guns, like the “Buy Build Shoot” kits, but it did not foreclose challenges to other specific kinds of ghost guns.
This case concerns the burden to prove workplace discrimination against members of a “majority group” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” §2000e–2(a)(1).
Marlean Ames filed a lawsuit claiming that her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services, denied her a promotion because she was a heterosexual woman. The Ohio Department of Youth Services, which operates the state’s juvenile correctional system, hired Ames in 2004 as an executive secretary and later promoted her to program administrator. Ames applied to a management position in the department’s Office of Quality and Improvement in 2019, but the department hired a different candidate, who was a lesbian. Days after interviewing for the management position, Ames was removed from her program administrator position and demoted to a secretarial role, resulting in a pay cut. The department then hired a gay man to fill the program administrator position.
Ames filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio arguing that she was denied the promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation. The District Court analyzed her claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which establishes the traditional burden-shifting framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the first step of this framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. The District Court cited to Sixth Circuit precedent in Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985) for the proposition that majority-group members bear an additional burden to prove discrimination. The District Court therefore concluded that Ames failed to make a showing that her employer acted with a discriminatory motive because she did not present evidence of “background circumstances” that would suggest that the department was a “rare employer who discriminates against members of a majority group.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision, reasoning that “background circumstances” could have been shown by presenting “evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . . against members of the majority group.” Ames appealed the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
LDF has been a longstanding leader in developing the legal doctrine interpreting Title VII. Using this expertise, LDF and several other civil rights organizations submitted an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reaffirm foundational civil rights cases that govern Title VII’s protections for all employees. The brief acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had incorrectly applied certain legal principles, specifically by requiring Ames to prove additional elements at that stage of the case, but argued that the Sixth Circuit had reached the correct outcome in ruling that Ames had not presented sufficient evidence of discrimination. The brief explained that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination regardless of whether the victim of discrimination is a member of a “majority” or “minority” group. The brief further demonstrated that certain individuals—especially Black and LGBTQ+ people—are disproportionately targeted by discriminatory practices, which may provide relevant background in evaluating circumstantial evidence presented in individual Title VII cases. The brief urged the Supreme Court to reaffirm the importance of Title VII’s protections for all employees, while also rejecting any rule that would prevent courts from considering the unfortunate realities of how discrimination tends to operate in society.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jackson, vacated the Sixth Circuit’s opinion against Ames and struck down the requirement that discrimination plaintiffs from majority groups must overcome a special evidentiary hurdle. The Court held that Title VII does not impose a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs in the first step of proving employment discrimination. As such, the Sixth Circuit’s heightened “background circumstances” standard was not supported by Title VII. The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirmed that everyone is entitled to Title VII’s protections from workplace discrimination, regardless of whether that person might be considered a member of a “minority” or “majority” group. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the District Court with instructions for it to apply the correct standard, which requires Ames to establish a prima facie case to decide whether she may continue her employment discrimination claim.
The Supreme Court decision explicitly reaffirmed the principle that employment discrimination is context-dependent and that what is required to establish unlawful discrimination may vary based on the facts of each case. In other words, Title VII turns on individualized facts, and Title VII’s anti-discrimination principles apply equally to all.
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a concurring opinion (joined by Justice Gorsuch) to highlight the problems he sees with the Title VII employment discrimination doctrine as a whole. He wrote, “As with the ‘background circumstances’ rule, the McDonnell Douglas framework lacks any basis in the text of Title VII and has proved difficult for courts to apply. In a case where the parties ask us to do so, I would be willing to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable and useful evidentiary tool.”
This case concerns the authority of district courts to issue universal injunctions. Three consolidated cases (Trump v. CASA, Inc., Trump v. Washington, and Trump v. New Jersey) made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court after several federal district judges issued nationwide injunctions that blocked the Trump administration’s January 20, 2025, executive order denying birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to babies born to parents who are unlawfully present or temporarily in the United States.
One of the Trump administration’s first acts in 2025 was to issue Executive Order 14160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” This executive order misconstrues the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in an effort to eliminate birthright citizenship to certain children born in the United States. Specifically, the order attempts to block citizenship (1) for babies whose “mother was unlawfully present in the United States” and whose “father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time” of the baby’s birth, or (2) for babies whose “mother’s presence in the United States was lawful but temporary” and whose “father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time” of the baby’s birth. Birthright citizenship is the principle that all children born in the United States are U.S. citizens, regardless their parents’ immigration status. This principle is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which states, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Despite this clear mandate, the executive order states that “the Fourteenth Amendment has never been interpreted to extend citizenship universally to everyone born within the United States.”
Individuals, organizations, and states filed several lawsuits to block the implementation and enforcement of the executive order. In each case, Trump v. CASA, Inc., Trump v. Washington, and Trump v. New Jersey, a district court concluded that the executive order was likely unlawful and entered a nationwide preliminary injunction barring the federal government from enforcing the provisions against newborns of undocumented immigrants or parents temporarily residing in the United States. Preliminary injunctions prohibit the enforcement of a law pending the outcome of a lawsuit. In each case, a court of appeals refused to overturn the nationwide injunction issued by the lower court. The federal government then filed an emergency application for a stay, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to halt the enforcement of the preliminary injunctions. The government’s application did not raise the question of whether the executive order violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship clause.
In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Barrett (with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissenting) the U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s request for a partial stay and further held that, in general, universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable powers of federal courts unless they are necessary to vindicate the rights of the parties who filed the lawsuit. For the three consolidated cases, this means that the lower courts must now determine the proper scope of the injunction that was issued. The decision effectively limits the ability of federal courts to prohibit the nationwide enforcement of harmful laws or policies pending the outcome of the legal proceedings. The Court further ruled that the executive order purporting to end birthright citizenship will not take effect until thirty days after the date of the opinion.
The majority reasoned that Congress has never granted federal courts the power to issue universal injunctions as an exercise of their equitable power (meaning their power to act in the interest of justice). The majority stated that “federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch; they resolve cases and controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given them.” The Court held that universal injunctions lack “a historical pedigree” and therefore cannot be issued by a federal court acting to do justice.
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion (joined by Justice Gorsuch) to emphasize his view that “[i]n no circumstance can a court award relief beyond that necessary to redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.” Justice Alito similarly wrote a concurring opinion (joined by Justice Thomas) to warn against states bringing suits on behalf of their residents and nationwide class actions as workarounds to universal injunctions. Justice Kavanaugh also concurred and wrote separately to underscore that this case focuses only on what district courts may do.
Justice Sotomayor, authoring the dissent, explained that the majority’s reasoning “distorts well-established equitable principles.” She asked the majority to consider the very real harm that will emanate from its decision, writing that “the Government may feel free to execute illegal policies against nonparties and cause immeasurable harm that this Court may never be able to remedy. Indeed, in these cases, there is a serious risk the Government will seek to deport newborns whose parents have not filed suit if all the injunctions are narrowed on remand. That unconscionable result only underscores why it is necessary, in some cases, for lower courts to issue universal injunctions.” Justice Sotomayor further wrote in dissent that the Court “abdicates its vital role” in standing for the rule of law.
Justice Jackson, while agreeing with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, authored a separate dissent focusing on the rule of law and the Constitution’s legal limits on government. Justice Jackson wrote in dissent that prohibiting universal injunctions against blatantly unconstitutional conduct is the Constitution “flipped on its head, for its promises are essentially nullified,” which creates “a zone of lawlessness within which the Executive has the prerogative to take or leave the law as it wishes, and where individuals who would otherwise be entitled to the law’s protection become subject to the Executive’s whims instead.” She explained, “The distribution of power between the Judiciary and the Executive is of particular importance to the operation of a society governed by law. Made up of ‘free, impartial, and independent’ judges and justices, the Judiciary checks the political branches of Government by explaining what the law is and ‘securing obedience’ with it.” Compelling the Executive to follow the law is particularly important where the relevant law is the Constitution. Justice Jackson explained that unlike Congress, which has its own means to check against the Executive’s violations of congressional acts (such as asserting the power of the purse), “when the Executive violates the Constitution, the only recourse is the courts.” Her dissent rejected the majority’s historical reasoning based on the High Court of Chancery in England, writing, “The Founders of the United States of America squarely rejected a governing system in which the King ruled all, and all others, including the courts, were his subordinates. In our Constitution-centered system, the People are the rulers and we have the rule of law.” She wrote, “In this country, the Executive does not stand above or outside of the law.”
Finally, Justice Jackson warned that the majority’s decision would create a two-tiered system: one tier in which law reigns for the named plaintiffs in suits that come before the courts, and a second tier populated by “those who lack the wherewithal or ability to go to court,” where the Executive may continue to violate the law. The rich, well-connected, and those in the good graces of the Executive will be able to secure legal representation, if needed, while “the poor, the uneducated, and the unpopular” will be subject to the Executive’s whims. Justice Jackson warned that “if judges must allow the Executive to act unlawfully in some circumstances . . . executive lawlessness will flourish . . . . Eventually, executive power will become completely uncontainable, and our beloved constitutional Republic will be no more.”
LDF and co-counsel, including the American Civil Liberties Union, are involved in a separate lawsuit, New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Donald J. Trump, similarly challenging the executive order. The lawsuit argues that the executive order seeks to create a tiered system of personhood by denying citizenship to children born in the United States and flouts the clear dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction blocking the executive order. The case is currently set for oral argument before a federal court of appeals on August 1, 2025. The U.S. Supreme Court did not address LDF’s case in the Trump v. CASA, Inc. ruling.
The principle of birthright citizenship has been enshrined in the U.S. Constitution for more than a century. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 during the Reconstruction Era and overturned the notorious Dred Scott U.S. Supreme Court decision that denied Black people the rights and protections of U.S. citizenship. In 1898, the principle of birthright citizenship was further solidified when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in United States v. Wong Kim Ark that children born in the United States to immigrant parents were entitled to U.S. citizenship. This unlawful executive order destabilizes families across the country and puts them in jeopardy. By excluding certain babies born in the United States from the full promise of U.S. citizenship, the executive order will operate to create a permanent underclass of people who may be rendered stateless. As the current administration seeks to breathe new life into a racialized notion of who is American and unilaterally rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment, LDF remains committed to fighting for a multi-racial democracy.
This case concerns opt-outs from lessons that parents believe will interfere with the religious development of their child. In 2022, the Montgomery County public school district in Maryland began incorporating storybooks featuring LGBTQ+ characters and storylines into its elementary school English curriculum. Some parents requested that their children be excused from lessons when these books were read. Initially, schools accommodated these requests, but by March 2023, the requests became too numerous to manage without disrupting the educational environment and the schools’ obligations to further an inclusive learning experience. At that time, the school system announced that it would no longer allow parents to opt their children out of the lessons, nor would it notify parents in advance of students reading an LGBTQ+ inclusive story.
Parents filed a lawsuit against the school district in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The parents argued that the elimination of opt-outs for LGBTQ+ inclusive materials violated their rights to free speech, free exercise (which requires government policies to be neutral toward religious exercise), and substantive due process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and state law. Substantive rights are those not explicitly listed in the Constitution, but considered to be so important they cannot be infringed upon without a compelling reason, such as the right to privacy. In their lawsuit, the parents argued that “the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.” The parents argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The District Court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Alito (with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissenting), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Montgomery County Public Schools must allow religious opt-outs from any lessons parents believe will interfere with the religious development of their child, including LGBTQ + inclusive curriculum. The majority held, “A government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses ‘a very real threat of undermining’ the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill.” For the majority, the storybooks themselves are problematic because, for example, one of the books “does not simply refer to same-sex marriage as an existing practice,” but rather, “presents acceptance of same-sex marriage as a perspective that should be celebrated.” According to the majority, this kind of message carries a “very real threat” of undermining religious convictions that parents may want to pass on to their children and goes beyond merely exposing children to the existence of LGBTQ+ people. As such, the religious rights of parents are burdened. The majority stated that the burden in this case requires applying strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of review a court can use to evaluate the constitutionality of a government action. To survive the strict scrutiny standard, the school district must demonstrate that the policy was justified by a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The majority concluded that the district failed to establish this standard because even if it had a compelling interest for the policy, the policy was not narrowly tailored because the district could not justify the inability for parents to opt out.
The dissenting justices, in an opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, warned that the majority decision “invents a constitutional right to avoid exposure to ‘subtle’ themes ‘contrary to the religious principles’ that parents wish to instill in their children.” They cautioned that the decision will lead to chaos for public schools and “hands a subset of parents the right to veto curricular choices” that have historically been left to locally elected school boards. The dissent explained the consequences further: “The damage to America’s public education system will be profound. Over 47 million students attend K-12 public schools in the United States, with nearly 17 million in elementary school. These students and their parents adhere to a wide range of religious beliefs, and the range of curricular topics, from science to literature to music and theater, covered in public schools is similarly vast. Against that backdrop, requiring schools to provide advance notice and the opportunity to opt out of every book, presentation, or field trip where students might encounter materials that conflict with their parents’ religious beliefs will impose impossible administrative burdens on schools.”
The Court’s decision will negatively impact the work being done by school districts to create inclusive learning environments through the introduction of books that depict LGBTQ+ people. However, nothing about the decision requires school districts to forgo these important efforts to foster inclusive learning environments that recognize and celebrate diversity.
This case concerns whether individuals who rely on Medicaid can sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to enforce their right to receive care from a qualified provider of their choice, such as Planned Parenthood. Established in 1965, during the Civil Rights Movement, Medicaid is a state-federal program that provides health care coverage to low-income individuals and people with disabilities. Medicaid provides federal funds to states that meet certain congressionally imposed conditions. Any state that wants to receive Medicaid funds must submit its plans to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for approval. The statute governing states’ plans for medical assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), requires that states allow patients freedom of choice, which means that patients must be able to obtain care from any qualified provider of their choosing. This requirement is often referred to as the “any qualified provider” provision.
In 2018, state officials in South Carolina attempted to remove Planned Parenthood from their Medicaid program simply because Planned Parenthood provides abortion care in addition to a range of other health services, such as preventive care and cancer screenings, treatment for sexually transmitted infections, birth control, and family planning. South Carolina’s governor issued an executive order that all “abortion clinics” are unqualified to provide health care services. The order directed the state’s Department of Health and Human Services to terminate the providers, including Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, from South Carolina’s Medicaid program.
In response, Planned Parenthood and a South Carolina woman named Julie Edwards who received medical care from Planned Parenthood and hoped to “shift all [her] gynecological and reproductive health care there” filed a lawsuit. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, she challenged the state’s prohibition on health care clinics that provide abortions from participating in Medicaid. Section 1983 permits private individuals to sue state actors who violate their rights under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Edwards argued that the “any qualified provider” provision of the federal Medicaid statute confers individuals with an enforceable right pursuant to Section 1983. Both the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Medicaid Act creates an individual right that can be enforced under Section 1983. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
In a 6-3 decision by Justice Gorsuch (with Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissenting), the U.S. Supreme Court held that individuals who rely on Medicaid cannot sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to enforce their right to receive care from the qualified provider of their choice. The majority held that the language in the “any qualified provider” provision of the Medicaid Act does not include “clear and unambiguous rights-creating language.” The opinion explained further that “Congress knows how to give a grantee clear and unambiguous notice that, if it accepts federal funds, it may face private suits asserting an individual right to choose a medical provider.” Throughout its analysis, the majority compared the federal Medicaid Act to the federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which the Supreme Court recently upheld as creating a private right of action. The Nursing Home Reform Act contains specific language that a nursing home resident has a “right” to choose a personal attending physician, whereas the federal Medicaid Act does not use the specific words “right” or “rights.” Justice Thomas agreed with the majority in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to recommend revisiting what constitutes a right under federal civil rights laws.
Justice Jackson wrote a dissent (joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor) arguing that the Medicaid provision “easily satisfies” the requirement of unambiguous rights-creating language. She wrote that the provision is clear that Medicaid plans must allow “any individual eligible for medical assistance” to “obtain such assistance from” any qualified provider. The dissent warned that “today’s decision is likely to result in tangible harm to real people. At a minimum, it will deprive Medicaid recipients in South Carolina of their only meaningful way of enforcing a right that Congress has expressly granted to them. And, more concretely, it will strip those South Carolinians—and countless other Medicaid recipients around the country—of a deeply personal freedom: the ‘ability to decide who treats us at our most vulnerable.’”
Justice Jackson’s dissent also analyzed the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and urged the majority to reckon with Reconstruction’s realities, writing, “In the wake of the Civil War, the American South was consumed by a wave of terrorist violence designed to disenfranchise and intimidate the country’s newly freed citizens and their allies. The threat was existential—not just for the newly liberated, but for democracy itself—and required bold intervention.” Justice Jackson noted that during this time, “[w]hite supremacist violence was spreading across the South” and threatened “public safety and the rule of law.” Today, the Civil Right Act of 1871’s first section, which was intended to open the federal courts to private citizens, is codified as Section 1983. While Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, pointed to the relatively few cases brought under Section 1983 during its first several decades, Justice Jackson’s dissent dispelled that theory by spotlighting the reality of Jim Crow, noting that “filing civil rights lawsuits during the Jim Crow era could be quite perilous, especially for the people whom the statute was originally meant to benefit [Black people]. Many would-be plaintiffs had reason to fear that filing a lawsuit would lead to physical or economic reprisals,” in addition to the challenges of securing a lawyer, prevailing before hostile juries, and enforcing a judgment.
Justice Jackson also urged the Court to broaden the scope of who is considered a “reasonable [person] at the time” a statute was written. She cited the Colored People’s Convention of the State of South Carolina, which defined a “right” as “the just claim, ownership, or lawful title which a person has to anything.” By foreclosing Medicaid recipients from using Section 1983 to enforce the Medicaid Act, the dissent explained, the majority “thwarts Congress’s will twice over.”
The Court’s decision comes at a time of growing government hostility toward reproductive freedom, and it weaponizes anti-abortion sentiments in order to disproportionately strip health care access from low-income communities, communities of color, LGBTQ+ people, people with disabilities, and women. This decision poses a grave threat to these communities by empowering states to block Medicaid patients from accessing care from qualified providers—not due to substandard care, but for purely political or ideological reasons, such as because those providers offer reproductive health services, LGBTQ+ care, or care to immigrant communities.
