Welcome to the annual preview of U.S. Supreme Court civil rights cases from the Thurgood Marshall Institute of the Legal Defense Fund (LDF). The Supreme Court 2026-2027 Term Preview provides a snapshot of each case’s issues and potential impact on civil rights. This easy-to-digest summary underscores the importance of the U.S. Supreme Court, and other courts, to our lives and the future of the nation’s democracy. Since its inception, LDF has served on the front lines of civil rights litigation efforts, including arguing many groundbreaking cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
This case concerns the amount of deference a federal sentencing court can give to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when determining what sentence should be imposed in a criminal case.
Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a person convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. During sentencing, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” The text of the Sentencing Guidelines does not define what “large capacity magazine” means. The accompanying Commentary, however, specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than fifteen rounds triggers an increased penalty. Beaird possessed a magazine that held seventeen rounds. He argued that the District Court should not rely on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines, and that the Commentary should not be considered when it expands the scope of sentencing beyond the actual Guidelines.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the Sentencing Commission to address widespread inconsistencies in federal criminal sentencing and to standardize policies and practices within the federal criminal legal system. The Commission established the sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal judicial system in the Guidelines Manual. The Guidelines help judges determine “the appropriate type of punishment—probation, fine, or term of imprisonment—and the extent of the punishment imposed.” The Guidelines Manual has three components: (1) the Guidelines for determining an individual’s sentence; (2) the Manual with policy statements; and (3) the Commentary. Both the Guidelines and the Manual contain extensive Commentary. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Stinson v. United States held that judges could rely upon the Commentary if the Commentary does not conflict with the Constitution, a federal law, or the Guidelines.
Relying on Stinson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Beaird’s sentence. The Court of Appeals held that Stinson foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the District Court’s reliance on the Guidelines Commentary.
William Maxwell was serving a 240-month sentence for racketeering conspiracy and related offenses. In 2020, Maxwell sought release to a halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act. Signed into law in December 2018, the First Step Act allows the reduction of federal prison sentences and transfer to a halfway house or home confinement when an incarcerated person participates in approved recidivism-reduction programs or productive activities.
The warden denied Maxwell’s request. After exhausting his administrative remedies in court, Maxwell filed a habeas corpus petition. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed his petition, finding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the First Step Act. After Maxwell appealed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, relying on the bright-line rule “that if a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit,” not a habeas petition. The Court found that because Maxwell petitioned to be transferred to a halfway house or home confinement and was not seeking accelerated release, he was not entitled to habeas relief.
In June 2007, Dexter Johnson was convicted and sentenced to death for the 2006 robbery, kidnapping, and murder of twenty-three-year-old Maria Aparece. At trial, Johnson’s defense expert tested his IQ as being between seventy-four and eighty-eight. The expert concluded that Johnson showed no obvious adaptive deficits and was not intellectually disabled. In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the DSM-5, which revised intellectual disability diagnosis by de-emphasizing IQ score cutoffs and recognizing that individuals with scores above seventy could still qualify as intellectually disabled.
In his first state and federal habeas petitions, Johnson did not raise a claim regarding his intellectual disability. When he filed a second federal habeas petition, it contained a new claim arguing that the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court case Atkins v. Virginia, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing people with intellectual disabilities, presented a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive. Johnson argued that because “the latest professional diagnostic manual [the DSM-5] changed the framework for intellectual disability,” his claim was unavailable in his first habeas petition.
After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approved his request to file a second habeas petition, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Johnson’s petition, relying on the Fifth Circuit’s “futility exception” in its decision In re Cathey. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial and clarified its In re Cathey ruling. The Court stated that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), judges cannot create exceptions to the rule that prohibits second or successive applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the statute requires the second or successive habeas petition to have a claim that has “some possibility of merit” for it to be considered “previously unavailable” under the statute.
Kekai Watanabe, an incarcerated individual at the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Honolulu, Hawaii, was brutally assaulted during a prison riot and gang-related fight in July 2021, leading to severe injuries. Several days later, Francis Nielsen, a staff nurse at FDC Honolulu, examined Watanabe. Medical records reflect that Watanabe told Nielsen he was experiencing severe back pain, rating the pain as a “ten.” Watanabe alleged that Nielsen told him to “stop being a crybaby.” When Watanabe requested treatment at a hospital, Nielsen refused. Instead of transporting Watanabe to a hospital or permitting him to be examined by a specialist, Nielsen treated him with nothing more than over-the-counter medication for his pain. Watanabe was kept in solitary confinement for two months, during which he submitted multiple requests for medical attention. It was later determined that his coccyx had been fractured and bone chips had entered the surrounding soft tissue.
Watanabe filed a damages action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution were violated when the medical staff at FDC Honolulu were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Bivens provides an implied damages remedy against federal officers for violating the Constitution.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii denied Watanabe’s claim. The Court applied the rule that a Bivens claim for damages can only be granted if the claim is similar to three circumstances in which the Supreme Court has granted damages for constitutional violations. The three circumstances are: (1) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971), a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure involving federal narcotics agents; (2) Davis v. Passman (1979), a Fifth Amendment due process claim for sex discrimination against a member of Congress; and (3) Carlson v. Green (1980), an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment in federal prison.
The District Court held that Watanabe’s claim arose in a new Bivens context, distinct from Carlson, because he had access to an alternative administrative remedy with the Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program. The Court further held that because Watanabe’s non-fatal injury differed meaningfully from the fatal asthma emergency in Carlson, he could not bring a Bivens claim.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled the District Court’s opinion, holding that Watanabe’s claim is like Carlson even though his injury was not fatal.
Kenneth Jouppi owned an airplane that he piloted on behalf of his air taxi company, KenAir LLC. Jouppi loaded the equivalent of three cases of beer into his airplane for a customer who had chartered his company’s services to fly from Fairbanks to Beaver, Alaska.
After a jury trial, Jouppi and KenAir were convicted of transporting beer by airplane into the village of Beaver, a “local option community” that prohibits the importation, sale, and possession of alcoholic beverages. They were fined $3,000, and Jouppi spent three days in jail. Upon conviction, Alaska law mandates the forfeiture of the airplane used to commit the offense. Jouppi argued that forfeiture of his airplane violates the Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
The Alaskan Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of Jouppi’s airplane does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the forfeiture of Jouppi’s airplane was punitive and was not an excessive fine because it was not grossly disproportional to his offense.
This case concerns whether the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a court to empanel twelve jurors in a criminal case. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Although the Sixth Amendment imposes this requirement on only the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted to apply the right to a jury to states.
Hamed Kian was charged with five counts of practicing chiropractic medicine with a suspended license, which is classified as a serious felony under Florida law. Florida’s Constitution provides the right of a trial by jury but requires only a minimum of six jurors. The Florida statute clarifying the Constitution states that a twelve-person jury is required for capital cases, while a six-person jury is required for all other criminal cases. Since Kian was tried in a non-capital case, a six-person jury heard his case and convicted him. The court then sentenced him to a year and a day in prison, followed by five years of probation.
Kian argued that trying him before a six-person jury violated his Sixth Amendment right. Kian is challenging the Supreme Court precedent set in the 1970 case Williams v. Florida, holding that a trial by a jury of six does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Kian argues that Williams was incorrectly decided and is contrary to the understanding of the Sixth Amendment at the time of the nation’s founding.
Kian appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, which affirmed his convictions and sentence without a written opinion. Because the Florida Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review district court decisions issued without a written opinion, Kian petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court directly.
LDF will file an amicus brief in this case.
This case concerns whether Arizona’s House Bill 2492 and House Bill 2243’s requirement of additional documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC) to vote violate the NVRA.
The NVRA was passed in 1993. Its goals were to strengthen the protections under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to increase the number of citizens registered to vote, and to establish safeguards that ensure citizens the right to vote. The NVRA created a uniform federal mail-in registration form that requires an applicant to only sign an oath swearing they are a citizen under penalty of perjury, without providing extra documents.
Arizona has a history of discrimination against voters of color, including imposing a literacy test in 1909 with the explicit aim to limit the “ignorant Mexican vote.” During the 1970s and 1980s, Arizona conducted voter roll purges of previously registered individuals, which resulted in fewer voters of color registering compared with white voters. In 2004, Arizona was the first state to pass a law requiring people to provide additional proof of citizenship to register to vote. In its 2013 decision in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Arizona law, holding that the NVRA preempts (prevents) state laws requiring DPOC. LDF filed an amicus brief in that case, highlighting the “long and well-documented history of discriminating against voters of color” in the United States and arguing that Congress enacted the NVRA “in response to persisting discriminatory voting laws and to equalize access to voter registration.”
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Arizona created a dual voter registration process: voters could register using either the federal form or Arizona’s state registration form. Citizens sued over the dual registration system in League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona v. Reagan. The parties entered into a 2018 consent agreement (the LULAC consent decree) requiring county recorders to register otherwise eligible voters for federal elections, regardless of whether they provided DPOC.
After the November 2020 presidential election, there were claims that noncitizens in Arizona unlawfully cast more than 36,000 votes. The Arizona Senate established a committee to audit the elections, but the audit did not reveal any evidence of voter fraud. In 2022, despite the absence of evidence, Arizona introduced new voting laws, H.B. 2492 and H.B. 2243. The Arizona Free Enterprise Club drafted the legislation and shared lobbying materials with Arizona legislators with the heading “How More Illegals Started Voting in AZ.”
H.B. 2492 requires Arizona election officials to reject state-form applications that lack the additional DPOC they request. The new law also prohibits voters who do not produce specific documents from using vote-by-mail, participating in early voting, or voting for president. H.B. 2492 also requires voters’ registration forms to be rejected if they fail to include their birthplace or to mark a checkbox indicating their U.S. citizenship, even if they submitted documentation proving their citizenship with their application. The voting laws further require county recorders to register state-form applicants without documentary proof of residency (DPOR) as “federal only” voters.
The voting laws amended provisions regulating voter registration and enabled government officials to require heightened proof of citizenship for individuals applying to vote in both federal and state elections. To vote in Arizona, a person must be a U.S. citizen, a resident of Arizona, at least eighteen years old, and not adjudicated, incapacitated, or convicted of a felony (Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 2).
The United States, several nonprofits, the Democratic National Committee, the Arizona Democratic Party, and three federally recognized tribes filed a lawsuit challenging the voting laws. The parties argued that Arizona’s laws were preempted by or in violation of the NVRA, the LULAC consent decree, the Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that certain provisions of the voting laws violated the NVRA. The District Court also held that state-form applicants without DPOC must be processed in accordance with the LULAC consent decree. Furthermore, the District Court held that the requirements imposed by the voting laws violated the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). The Materiality Provision prohibits states from denying an individual the right to vote “because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election.” The Court found that the Arizona statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and found that the laws were not enacted with an intent to discriminate.
Arizona and other defendants, including the Republican National Committee, appealed the District Court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the NVRA preempted the voting laws because the laws required the use of the state form to register for federal elections along with DPOR. The Court found that the voting laws required federal voters to provide more information than what the federal form required. The Court also held that the voting laws’ vote-by-mail provisions were a “sufficient obstacle” to the “accomplishment and execution of the [NVRA’s] full purposes” and that the laws limited federal voters’ “fundamental right to vote.” The Court relied on the fact that nearly ninety percent of Arizona voters cast ballots by mail in 2020. It also cited that “Congress explicitly noted in its findings for the NVRA that ‘discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in [federal] elections.’”
The Court also held that requiring DPOC to vote in federal elections was expressly preempted by the NVRA. It further held that the state form had unnecessary additional requirements of DPOC, DPOR, and birthplace.
The Court held that Arizona’s periodic cancellation of registrations violated the ninety-day provision of the NVRA. This provision requires that “any State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office . . . shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” The Court struck down Arizona’s periodic cancellation of registrations as violating the NVRA’s mandate that states must complete no later than ninety days prior to the date of a primary or general election the removal of ineligible names from the voter rolls. The Court also found that Arizona’s citizenship checks were nonuniform and had a discriminatory effect. Specifically, the Court found that naturalized citizens would be at risk if this provision were discriminatorily applied.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the voting laws violated the LULAC consent decree because they required county recorders to reject state-form applications without DPOC. The Court also upheld the District Court’s ruling that the voting laws violated the Materiality Provision of Civil Rights Act. The Court struck down Arizona’s “reason to believe” provision, holding that it violated the Civil Rights Act because it encourages county recorders to apply different standards, practices, and procedures to naturalized citizens. The Court overturned the District Court’s ruling on discriminatory intent, finding that the District Court applied a higher evidentiary standard to the voting laws than that required by the Arlington Heights test. The Court did not find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifteenth Amendment, stating that Arizona’s DPOC and DPOR requirements were applied uniformly.
The Archdiocese of Denver, two Catholic parishes and their associated preschools (St. Mary Catholic Parish and St. Bernadette Catholic Parish), and two parents of preschool-age children filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (a civil action for deprivation of rights) alleging that a Colorado statute requiring preschools receiving state funds to sign a nondiscrimination agreement violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment.
In 2020, Colorado voters approved a proposition that created a dedicated source of public funding for voluntary, universal preschool across the state. Following this vote, Colorado passed legislation and established a universal preschool program (UPK). To meet the legislative goals, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood created uniform quality standards for all preschools receiving UPK funding. The standards required all participating schools to sign a nondiscrimination agreement that they would “provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability,” related to the child or the child’s family. Colorado preschools are not required to participate in UPK, but schools that receive funding must sign the nondiscrimination agreement.
The preschools associated with St. Mary Catholic Parish and St. Bernadette Catholic Parish refused to sign the nondiscrimination agreement. They argued that Catholic preschools must adhere to “Catholic faith, morals, [and] the building up of Catholic culture within the school,” which requires that they consider the sexual orientation and gender identity of a prospective student and their parents. In 2023, the Archdiocese of Denver instructed its preschools not to register with UPK so that they would not have to sign the nondiscrimination agreement. The Archdiocese did permit several preschools affiliated with Catholic Charities and aimed at low-income families to participate in UPK. The Archdiocese also requested faith-based exemptions, which were denied.
Following a bench trial, U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado found that the nondiscrimination requirement did not violate the First Amendment and denied injunctive relief. The District Court held that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral and generally applicable law and therefore not unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the “Free Exercise Clause does not prevent individuals from being subject to valid and neutral law of general applicability that incidentally conflicts with their religion.” In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals applied a lower standard of review, finding that where a law is neutral and generally applicable, the law must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court held that the higher, strict scrutiny standard, under which a law that burdens a religious practice must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest, was not applicable.
LDF filed an amicus brief in this case on August 24, 2026.
Thomas Crowther, formerly a professor at Augusta University in Georgia, and MaChelle Joseph, formerly the head women’s basketball coach at the Georgia Institute of Technology, filed separate complaints against the University System of Georgia alleging discrimination and retaliation.
Crowther worked as an art professor at Augusta University from 2006 through spring 2021. During the spring 2020 semester, several students complained that he sexually harassed them. “While the University investigated those complaints, the Chair of the Department of Art and Design issued Crowther a negative evaluation of his teaching and tried to negotiate his resignation.” The university found that he violated the school’s sexual harassment policy and suspended him for one semester. His dean reassigned him to remedial tasks and refused to renew his contract for the 2021–22 academic year. Crowther sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and several officials for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX and other provisions of federal law.
Joseph was the head women’s basketball coach at Georgia Tech from 2003 until 2019. She was responsible for coaching the team, recruiting new players, hiring and managing assistant coaches, and marketing the team and their games. The women’s head basketball coach performed similar duties to the men’s head coach. During Joseph’s tenure, however, the men’s basketball program consistently received more funding and resources from Georgia Tech than the women’s program. Joseph learned about these differences during the 2006–07 academic year and began to raise concerns about the disparity with Georgia Tech’s Title IX coordinator for athletics. She filed a formal internal complaint alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in early 2019. Around the same time, Georgia Tech hired an outside investigator to examine complaints about her coaching conduct, placed her on administrative leave, and fired her weeks later based on the investigator’s report finding that she had created a harmful environment for players.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed both cases. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases and held that Title IX does not provide Crowther or Joseph a private right of action for sex discrimination in employment, nor does it provide a private right of action for retaliation.
Cutberto Viramontes, Christopher Khaya, the Second Amendment Foundation, and Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Cook County, Illinois, assault weapons ban ordinance. Viramontes and Khaya are members of the organizations, and they argue that the ordinance violates their Second Amendment right to own a semiautomatic rifle. The ordinance prohibits the possession, acquisition, or transfer of “assault weapons,” which encompasses a variety of firearms, including semiautomatic rifles capable of accepting large-capacity magazines and possessing certain features. Viramontes alleged that he wants to purchase an AR-15-style rifle that he intends to use for self-defense. Khaya alleged that he wants to purchase a semiautomatic rifle to take to the firing range. The ordinance bans both rifles.
Viramontes and Khaya filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in August 2021. The District Court dismissed their cases. They appealed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the District Court’s decision. No injunction was issued pending the appeals.
The Supreme Court consolidated Viramontes with Grant v. Higgins, in which Eddie Grant Jr., Jennifer Hamilton, Michael Stiefel, Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc., and the Second Amendment Foundation challenged Connecticut’s ban on semiautomatic rifles. Connecticut’s ban was passed in the wake of the mass shooting that killed twenty-six children and educators at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012. Similar to Cook County, Connecticut’s definition of “assault weapons” includes many, but not all, types of fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms. Likewise, in this case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not grant a preliminary injunction halting the Connecticut ban on semiautomatic rifles.
Both appellate courts relied on the 2022 U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which held that when the Second Amendment covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct and the government has the burden to “justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The courts applied this standard, holding that “it is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the text of the Second Amendment, viewed through the lens of historical tradition, protects the regulated conduct,” meaning owning a semiautomatic rifle.
Two national organizations (International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., and Advocates Protecting Children) and five sets of Washington parents using pseudonyms brought constitutional challenges against two amendments to Washington state law that provide different reporting standards for children experiencing gender dysphoria who seek assistance from a youth shelter. They argued that the amendments violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Free Speech Clause.
Prior to amending the law, Washington state required licensed youth shelters to notify parents within seventy-two hours when a minor arrived at their facility. The facilities were required to provide the child’s location, their physical and emotional condition, and the reasons why they came to the shelter, and parents could pick up their children. The law contained an exception to the parental notification requirements if a child made an allegation of neglect.
In 2023, Washington enacted two amendments to the notification requirements for transgender children. The amendments added a second exception to the parental notification requirement, for youth who are “seeking or receiving protected health care services,” including “gender-affirming treatment” and “reproductive health care services.” Under the amended legislation, a shelter receiving such a child must notify the Washington State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) instead of the parents. DCYF is required to provide mental and behavioral health services to the child, without the parent’s consent. The amendments also allow qualifying minors to stay in the shelter for up to ninety days without parental permission.
The parents who filed the suit to challenge the amendments raised various issues related to their children. They said they were concerned that at some point in the future, their children might identify as transgender, run away, seek refuge with a licensed shelter, decline reconciliation services, accept a referral for behavioral health services, and ultimately receive gender-affirming care.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington stated that the individuals’ claims were based on a “speculative chain of possibilities” and that they had not suffered concrete injuries sufficient to confer standing. The District Court also held that the organizations did not submit enough evidence to demonstrate organizational standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that the plaintiffs could not show current or future injuries to confer Article III standing under the U.S. Constitution.
Daniel Grand lives in University Heights, Ohio. Grand’s Orthodox Jewish faith requires him to pray three times a day with a group of ten men. Because his faith also requires that he cannot drive on the Sabbath, it is difficult for him to travel to the synagogue on that day. Thus, Grand began inviting friends to pray with him at his home on the Sabbath. After a neighbor complained, the City issued Grand a cease-and-desist letter stating he was violating the City’s zoning laws because he was using his house as “a place of religious assembly.” Grand then applied for a special use permit to use his home as “a place of religious assembly,” and the City’s Planning Commission held a public hearing on his application. The City unexpectedly converted the hearing to a “quasi-judicial” format, which did not allow Grand to submit additional materials. Before City officials could address his application, Grand withdrew his request, stating that he did not “wish to operate a house of worship as is defined under the zoning ordinance.” After withdrawing his application, Grand filed a lawsuit against the City and several officials.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the City and dismissed Grand’s core constitutional and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims without prejudice for lack of ripeness, concluding that the City did not issue a final land use decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. It held that Grand’s claims remained unripe absent a final determination from the Planning Commission. The Court of Appeals did not separately consider his substantive claims, including whether Grand’s First Amendment rights were independently chilled.
